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INTRODUCTION

In many ways, Mark Kelman's analysis' is typical of the more
sophisticated critical legal theorists. He recognizes that judges' decisions are shaped in part by forces that have little or no impact on
other political actors. 2 At the same time, however, Professor Kelman's
analysis starts from the premise that "our basic political ideologies
determine the legal positions we advocate more than any other factor:
there are literally no legal issues that anyone cares about in which
ideological predispositions lack primary importance. ' 3 From this perspective, Kelman heaps scorn on traditional, process-oriented legal
scholarship. 4 He argues that the primary task of centrist liberals and
other legal scholars is to articulate and defend both a coherent ideological vision of rights and the proper course for government generally. 5
Professor Kelman's perspective is, in many ways, quite seductive.
It invites law professors to break out of their intellectual isolation and
participate directly in debates that are central to the future of American society. The difficulty, however, is that the mode of legal scholarship Kelman advocates would both maximize the weaknesses and
minimize the strengths that law professors can bring to the debate
over legal issues. This comment will explore that difficulty and suggest
a focus for legal scholarship that would avoid the problems of Professor
Kelman's approach.
*Professor of Law, Rutgers (Camden), B.A., 1972, Northwestern; J.D., 1975, Harvard.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Kelman, Emerging Centrist Liberalism, 43 FLA. L. REv. 417 (1991).
Id.
Id. at 417-18.
See id. at 420-21 & nn.7-11.
See id. at 442-44.
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CRITICAL THEORY AND THE
II.
EVOLUTION OF LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

Professor Kelman's paper reflects the dramatic changes that have
taken place in legal scholarship during the second half of the twentieth
century. These changes have been particularly apparent in constitutional scholarship. As Professor Kelman notes, legal scholarship of the
1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s was dominated by two themes. First,
legal scholarship of that time generally was concerned with the process
of adjudication, rather than the need to reach specific desirable results. 6 Second, constitutional analysis focused on the need to constrain
the judiciary in order to preserve the integrity of the democratic
process.7 Concern with these issues cut across conventional ideological
lines.8
The classic centrist liberal article of that era was Herbert
Wechsler's Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law.9
Wechsler argued against ad hoc analysis of the results of specific cases,
contending instead that "the main constituent of the judicial process
is . . . that it must be genuinely principled, resting . . . on analysis
and reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is
achieved." 10 Analyzing Brown v. Board of Education"l from this perspective, Wechsler questioned the legitimacy of the determination that
school segregation was unconstitutional,' 2 notwithstanding his expressed distaste for the policy of segregation itself.13
Beginning in the 1970s, critical legal scholars launched a powerful
attack on the underpinnings of the then-dominant mode of legal
analysis. They argued that judicial results reflect judges' general political beliefs more clearly than they reflect neutral, distinctively legal
principles.14 Further, as a normative matter, the critical legal scholars
contended that virtually any result can be justified by reference to
the appropriately described neutral principle. 15 Thus, the critical legal

6.

See id. at 420-22 & nn.7-11.

7.

See id. at 422-24.

8. See id. at 420-22 & nn.7-1I.

9. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
10.
11.

Id. at 15.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).

12. Wechsler, supra note 9, at 33-34.
13. Id. at 34.
14. See, e.g., Tushnet, The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 411
(1981).
15.

See, e.g., Spann, Deconstructing the Legislative Veto, 68 MINN. L. REV. 473 (1984);

Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivismand Neutral Principles,
96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1983).
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scholars concluded that the dominant methodology was intellectually
bankrupt.
These arguments brought the orthodox approach to legal analysis
under severe intellectual pressure. In addition, an important change
in political context contributed to the undermining of the centrist
liberals' commitment to a process oriented, constraining mode of legal
scholarship. Legal scholars of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s operated in
the shadow of the Lochner era, 16 when an activist Court often struck
down legislative initiatives 17 embodying elements of the centrist liberal
political program. In contrast, since Brown, judicial activism had had
a quite different impact, generally defending centrist liberal values
from attacks by more conservative government actors. 18 Thus, from
a purely political perspective, the centrist liberal emphasis on the
legislative process and its concomitant advocacy of judicial restraint
became considerably less attractive. 9
Centrist liberals have reacted to these forces by adopting a more
overtly political approach to constitutional adjudication. Some centrist
liberals have embraced the critical theorists' view that constitutional
'interpretation" is an intrinsically open-ended process leaving judges
essentially unconstrained.20 Other centrist liberals have employed a
variety of devices in an effort to maintain links to the traditional
process oriented analysis and the ideology of neutral principles. For
instance, some claim that the drafters of the Constitution intended
that there be wide-ranging, open-ended judicial review. 21 Others argue
that the Constitution as a whole embodies a broad political theory
such as representative democracy,2 classical republicanism,2 or toler16.

See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding maximum hour legis-

lation unconstitutional).
17. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding minimum wage
legislation unconstitutional).
18. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (holding statutory classification
based upon gender unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding complete prohibition of abortion at any stage of pregnancy unconstitutional); Brown, 347 U.S. at 483 (holding
school segregation unconstitutional).
19. See generally Maltz, The Court, the Academy and the Constitution: A Comment on
Bowers v. Hardwick and Its Critics, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REv. 59, 65-80 (discussing evolution of

centrist liberal analysis).
20. See, e.g., Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a
Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REv. 603 (1985).
21. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514-16 (2d ed. 1988); Sedler,
The Legitimacy Debatein ConstitutionalInterpretation:An Assessment and a DifferentPerspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 126-37 (1983).
22. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

23. See, e.g., Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Sunstein, Interest
Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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ance .A Still other centrist liberals claim that the federal judiciary is
uniquely well-placed to make fundamental moral decisions for society,2
or at the very least to contribute a unique perspective to debates on
these issues.26
By a strange coincidence, however, all of these views of the judicial
role lead to the same conclusion: that the courts should require other
branches of government to follow some or all of the principles espoused
by the liberal wing of the Democratic party. Therefore, while the
preliminary appeal to neutral principles serves a legitimating function
in this centrist liberal literature, it is generally clear that the main
point of the argument is the advancement of specific substantive
policies.
Until quite recently, conservative constitutional scholars generally
remained loyal to the theory of constitutional analysis that developed
in the 1950s and 1960s. The political pressures on this conservative
group were quite different from those that shaped the centrist liberal
approach. As judicial activism increasingly favored centrist liberal positions, it behooved conservatives to elaborate a theory of judicial
review that strongly constrained the Court. The ideology of neutral
principles, in this case often embodied in the defense of a jurisprudence
based on originalism,27 was a natural choice to serve this purpose.
By the late 1980s, however, a number of the most prominent conservative commentators had begun to abandon this position. These
commentators favored an advocacy of judicial activism based on either
the theory of law and economics or a more general libertarian approach.2 A variety of factors no doubt influenced this trend. First,
the centrist liberal advocacy of judicial activism was proving impervious to arguments based on the ideology of neutral principles. Indeed,
centrist liberals were arguing for ever-increasing judicial intervention
in support of their positions. Second, the composition of the Supreme
Court itself had changed, with conservative Justices becoming ascendant. This change raised the likelihood that a generalized judicial activism would favor conservative positions. In such a climate, increasing
calls for judicial activism by conservatives were almost inevitable.

24.
25.
26.
(1982);
27.
L.J. 1
28.

See, e.g., D.

RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
See, e.g., Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1979).
See, e.g., P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 182-83
M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 113 (1982).
See, e.g., Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
(1971); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693 (1976).
See, e.g., J. DORN & H. MANNE, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY (1987).
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Taken together, these forces have changed dramatically the character of legal scholarship. Discussions of the proper application of the
ideology of neutral principles largely have faded into the background.
Instead, the law journals (particularly the most prestigious law journals) are filled with articles that primarily define and defend a particular vision of a "good" society, and then describe the best strategy for
judicial implementation of that vision.
This new emphasis in legal scholarship creates a number of difficulties. Most importantly, it forces law professors to focus on tasks that
they are often simply unqualified to perform. The distinguishing feature of legal academics is their postgraduate training in law schools.
This training does not significantly enhance their expertise in
economics, philosophy, political science, sociology or any other discipline related to the definition of a general substantive vision of a good
society. Instead, legal education focuses on the operation of specialized
legal conventions - neutral principles of the highest order of generality. These legal conventions can be used to persuade judges to adopt
some preexisting substantive vision, but they cannot define the vision
itself.
When legal scholars attempt to define their vision of a "good"
society in the manner that Professor Kelman suggests,2 the limited
scope of their education often becomes painfully apparent. In many
cases, the legal scholarship dealing with these issues is merely an
oversimplified or garbled presentation of the secondary sources from
other disciplines. Such efforts may impress those who are less well
read than the author, and perhaps more importantly, the student
editors whose judgments are so important to professional standing in
legal education. However, they make no real independent contribution
to our substantive understanding of the issues involved in defining a
"good" society.
Admittedly, some interdisciplinary legal scholarship avoids these
difficulties. A few law professors have postgraduate education in other
fields and use that training well. Others may overcome their lack of
formal training and contribute substantially to the discussion of broad
issues of public policy. Nonetheless, an emphasis like that of Professor
Kelman effectively renders legal education irrelevant to legal scholarship. Thus, it denies the possibility that legal scholars as a class can
play a definable, unique role in adding to our knowledge of the way
in which governmental institutions do and should operate.
The relative narrowness of their expertise thus presents law professors with something of a dilemma. Realists and critical legal scholars
29.

See Kelman, supra note 1.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

5

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
450

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

have argued persuasively that judicial decisions are best viewed as
applied political theory.30 Yet legal scholars are unqualified to discuss
these decisions at the level of general political theory. Therefore, they
must contribute to the understanding of specific judicial decisions and
the judicial decisionmaking process generally in a different manner.
Legal scholars can escape this dilemma by focusing on the constraints that are unique to the judicial decisionmaking process. Without
question, the political factors featured so prominently in the contemporary scholarship strongly influence judicial decisions. However, the
fact remains that judges typically do not consciously focus on those
factors in reaching their decisions; instead, virtually all are committed
to Wechsler's ideology of neutral principles.31 This phenomenon should
not be surprising: Wechsler's aspirations for the judicial process reflect
beliefs that are widely held in American society and strongly reinforced
by the law school education that all judges must undergo.
Critical legal theorists downplay the importance of this point, contending that distinctively legal principles never yield determinate answers. This response is effective against attempts to deploy the ideology of neutral principles as a normative defense of particular results.
It does not, however, demonstrate that the ideology of neutral principles is not in fact an element in the judicial decisionmaking process.
To the contrary, judges' commitment to good faith implementation of
this basic ideology has a demonstrable impact on their approach to
judicial decisionmaking, even where the results of the application of
the ideology are controversial.
The importance of neutral principles to the judicial process presents
an important opportunity for legal academics. Legal education is centered on the interaction between the ideology of neutral principles
and other factors in "difficult" cases. Further, law professors are
drawn from the ranks of highly successful law students, those who
have demonstrated the most talent for dealing with this interaction.
Therefore, legal scholars are peculiarly well qualified to analyze how
the judicial thought process differs from that of other governmental
decisionmakers.
The approach to legal scholarship advocated by Professor Kelman
and other critical theorists does not take advantage of this special
expertise of legal scholars. Indeed, an analysis centered on peculiarly
legal knowledge would essentially be a mirror image of Kelman's approach. This analysis would be descriptive rather than normative. It

30.
31.

See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
See Wechsler, supra note 9.
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would recognize that judicial decisions are bounded by mainstream
American political values, and that within those bounds judges are
influenced strongly by their personal political views. Primarily, however, the analysis would focus on how the ideology of neutral principles
influences the overall judicial decisionmaking process. As the next
section of this comment will demonstrate, a focus on this influence
can yield important insights into both constitutional and nonconstitutional decisionmaking.
III. NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS
A. Neutral Principles and Constitutional Law
The Supreme Court's decision in South Carolinav. Gathers3 2 demonstrates the importance of the ideology of neutral principles in constitutional cases. Gathers involved a challenge to the death sentence
imposed on a defendant convicted of murder and first degree criminal
sexual conduct. During the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecutor read extensively from a religious tract that the victim had
been carrying. Further, the prosecutor commented on personal qualities he inferred from the victim's possession of the tract and a voter
registration card.1 The defendant argued that the prosecutor's use of
such information rendered the imposition of the death sentence unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. 36By a 5-4 vote, the Supreme
Court adopted the defendant's position.3
Gathers was influenced strongly by the Court's earlier decision in
Booth v. Maryland.3 The Booth Court analyzed the constitutionality
of a Maryland law requiring juries in capital cases to consider a victim
impact statement (VIS), which the state included in its presentence
report. 39 In Booth, the VIS was based on information gathered from
the family of two murder victims. 40 The VIS described the personal
characteristics of the victims, the severe impact of the crimes on the
victims' family, and the family members' opinions and characterizations
of the crime and the defendant. 41

32. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
33. Id. at 805.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 808-09.
Id. at 809-11.
See id. at 810.
See id. at 805.
482 U.S. 496 (1987).

39. Id. at 498-500.
40.
41.

Id. at 499.
Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1991

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 43, Iss. 3 [1991], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Over four dissents,42 the Booth Court found the introduction of the
VIS unconstitutional.43 Justice Powell's majority opinion concluded that
the admission of the VIS created a constitutionally unacceptable risk
that the jury might impose the death penalty in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.- Powell based his conclusion partially on the argument that the VIS introduced factors that might be "wholly unrelated
to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant. ' ' 45 The consideration
of such evidence "could result in imposing the death sentence because
of factors about which the defendant was unaware, and that were
'46
irrelevant to the decision to kill.
Not surprisingly, the majority opinion in Gathers relied heavily on
the reasoning in Booth.4 7 'Indeed, speaking for the Court, Justice Brennan treated Gathers as a simple application of the neutral principle of
stare decisis.- Brennan noted that the Booth VIS included descriptions
of the victims' personal characteristics by the victims' survivors. 49 In
Gathers, he concluded that even though "it was the prosecutor rather
than the victim's survivors who characterized the victim's personal
qualities, the statement is indistinguishable in any relevant respect
''5
from that in Booth. 0
The four dissenters in Gathers recognized that the stare decisis
issue raised by Booth significantly weakened their position. 51 Speaking
only for himself, Justice Scalia argued that overruling Booth would
create few of the problems normally associated with abandoning precedent.5 2 The remaining three dissenters joined Justice O'Connor's
opinion,- which approached the problem differently. Justice O'Connor
noted a willingness to overrule Booth; however, she devoted far
greater effort to distinguishing that case from Gathers. '4 Because
Booth did not involve comments by the prosecutor, O'Connor argued
that it was not necessary to read the case as establishing "a rigid

42.
Justice
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See id. at 515-19 (White, J., dissenting); id. at 519-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Chief
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor joined in these dissents. See id. at 515, 519.
Id. at 509.
Id. at 505-09.
Id. at 504.
Id. at 505.
See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 811.
Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 813-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 823-25 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id. at 812 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id.at 813-23.
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Eighth Amendment rule eliminating virtually all consideration of the
victim at the penalty phase."'' Instead, she contended, Booth could
be read more narrowly to "allow jury consideration of information
about the victim and the extent of the harm."' O'Connor concluded
that the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated in
Gathers.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Gathers clearly reflect
the rhetorical significance of the ideology of neutral principles in judicial decisions. On their face, however, they do not demonstrate the
substantive impact of that ideology on the actual results of cases.
Indeed, a comparison of Justices Brennan's and O'Connor's treatment
of Booth supports one of the key tenets of critical legal theory: the
idea that precedent is very malleable. Moreover, in Gathers, almost
all of the Justices read Booth in a manner consistent with the substantive views that they had expressed in Booth. Once again, this outcome
is more consistent with critical legal theory than the ideology of neutral
principles.
By contrast, Justice White's action in Gathers57 reflects the substantive importance of neutral principles. Justice White was the only Booth
dissenter to join the Gathers majority. Further, his vote was critical
to the Gathers result. After Booth, the author of the majority opinion,
Justice Powell, was succeeded by Justice Kennedy. Justice Kennedy
joined the Gathers dissenters. Thus, if Justice White had remained
with his erstwhile allies in Gathers, the case would have been decided
differently.
Critical legal theory does not provide a rationale for Justice White's
change in position. The ideology of neutral principles, on the other
hand, provides a clear, plausible explanation. In his brief concurring
opinion in Gathers, Justice White concluded that the majority's position
must be accepted "[u]nless Booth is to be overruled."' In conjunction
with this statement, Justice White's vote in Booth implies two points.
First, while O'Connor's reading of Booth might have been plausible,
Justice White read the case as controlling Gathers. Second, Justice
White, at least at the time Gathers was decided, was not sufficiently
disenchanted with the Booth result to overcome his allegiance to the
doctrine of stare decisis.5 9 Thus, Justice White's vote in Gathers illus-

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
decided

Id. at 814.
Id.
Id. at 812 (White, J., concurring).
Id. (citation omitted).
Justice White's view on this point apparently changed between the time Gathers was
and the Court's subsequent disposition of Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S.Ct. 2597 (1991).
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trates clearly the impact of the ideology of neutral principles on the
decisionmaking process.
B.

Neutral Principles and Statutory Analysis

Gathers is a fairly simple example of the interaction between the
ideology of neutral principles and other factors that influence judicial
decisionmaking. However, neutral principles can be even more important in statutory cases. The Court's shifting treatment of 42 U.S.C.
sections 1981 and 19826 provides a relatively complex example.
Section 1981 provides that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of
the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens. ' ' 61 Section 1982 states that "[a]ll citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and
convey real and personal property." 62 In the modern era, the key
question has been the applicability of these statutory prohibitions to
purely private acts of racial discrimination. The Warren Court first
considered this issue in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.- In that case,
the Court held by a vote of 7-2,6 that section 1982 prohibited private
racial discrimination in transactions related to real property.65
The dispute between the majority and the dissent in Jones focused
on both proper application of the doctrine of stare decisis and proper
interpretation of the statutory language. On the stare decisis issue,
the Jones dissent argued that Hurd v. Hodge6 held definitively that
section 1982 did not reach purely private discrimination.6 7 In contrast,
the majority characterized this statement in Hurd as nonbinding dictum. 68

In Payne, he joined the majority in overruling both Booth and Gathers. Unlike in Gathers,
Justice White's vote was not critical in Payne; a change in the makeup of the Court had left
the Booth/Gathers doctrine with only three supporters. But in any event, the fundamental lesson
of Gathers - that the ideology of neutral principles can and does have an important impact on
judicial decisionmaking - remains unaffected by Justice White's post-Gathers change of heart.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988).
61. Id. § 1981.
62. Id. § 1982.
63. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
64. See id.
65. Id. at 440-44.
66. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
67. Jones, 392 U.S. at 452 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 420 n.25.
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The dispute over statutory language also was phrased in terms of
the widely accepted neutral principles that courts should effectuate
legislative intent, and the corollary that courts should follow the "plain
meaning" of statutory language in the absence of strong contrary
evidence of legislative intent.69 The Jones majority argued that, on
its face, the language of section 1982 seemed to prohibit private discrimination by guaranteeing blacks "the same right" as whites to acquire real property. 70 Further, the majority argued that the legislative
history of section 1982 supported this conclusion.71 Finally, the majority concluded that section two of the Thirteenth Amendment vested
Congress with the authority to reach private discrimination.2 In contrast, the dissent contended that the language of section 1982 was
ambiguous7 and that the legislative history and context of the statute
suggested an intent to prohibit only state-imposed racial discrimination. 4
The Jones holding was extended to cover section 1981 in Runyon
v. McCrary.7 5 In Runyon, seven members of the Court concluded that
section 1981 prohibited a private school from excluding black applicants
from its student body solely on the basis of race. 76 All members of
the majority saw Runyon as clearly controlled by Jones.7 Included
in this group were Justices Powell and Stevens, who had not been on
the Court at the time Jones was decided. Each filed a separate opinion
in Runyon7s conceding that the majority's view of the legislative history in Jones was at best questionable 79 but concluding that the result
in Runyon was compelled by the doctrine of stare decisis. 80
The two Runyon dissenters, Justices White and Rehnquist, took
a different view.8' Rather than arguing that Jones should be overruled,
they strained to demonstrate that the Jones case was distinguishable
from Runyon.& The dissenting opinion first argued that while section

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See id. at 420, 437.
Id. at 420-22.
Id. at 422-37.
Id. at 437-44.
Id. at 452-54 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 455-76.
427 U.S. 160 (1976).
Id. at 168-75.
Id.
Id. at 186-89 (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 189-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Id. at 186; id. at 189.
Id. at 186; id. at 189-92.
Id. at 192-214 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 213-14.
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1982 was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866, section 1981 was
derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1870. 3 Second, Justices White
and Rehnquist noted that while the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
passed to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment, the Civil Rights Act
of 1870 was adopted pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment.- Therefore, the dissenters argued that because the prohibitions
of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to purely private action,
section 1981 logically could not have been intended to reach such
action.As in Jones and Runyon, discussions of precedent also played a
central role in Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union. Pattersonbegan
as a section 1981 action alleging racial harassment and racially-motivated refusal to promote the plaintiff employee.8 7 Initially, the Court
granted certiorari to resolve two issues: the applicability of section
1981 to racial harassment, and the appropriateness of the specific jury
instruction given on the promotion claim.- After the first oral argument, however, a majority of the Court issued a sua sponte order
requesting briefs and argument on the question of whether Runyon
should be overruled. 9 None of the five Justices who concurred in the
order had been members of the Runyon majority.9
On re-argument, the Patterson Court declined to overrule Runyon. 91 Nonetheless, the Court limited the applicability of section 1981
in employment discrimination cases.9 2 The same five Justices who had
concurred in the order for re-argument also joined Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion.93 Emphasizing the particular significance of the doctrine of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases,- Justice Kennedy concluded that the defendants had not shown any "special justifi95
cation" to support overturning Runyon.
On the specific issues of racial harassment and discrimination in
promotion, Justice Kennedy relied primarily on the kind of close tex-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 197-202.
Id. at 201-02.
491 U.S. 164 (1989).
Id. at 169.
484 U.S. 814 (1987).
485 U.S. 617 (1988).
See Runyon, 427 U.S. at 163; Patterson, 491 U.S. at 167.
Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174-75.
Id. at 175-85.
See id. at 167.
Id. at 171-73.
Id. at 173.
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tual analysis that underlay the Jones holding.9 He observed that by
its terms the language of section 1981 does not extend to the employer's
conduct after the contractual relationship has been established.Y
Therefore, Justice Kennedy concluded that a refusal to promote was
covered by section 1981 only if the promotion would have involved
the making of an entirely new contract.9 Further, Justice Kennedy
determined that the racial harassment claim was not actionable under
any circumstances.9
Justices Stevens' °° and Brennano1 dissented from the Patterson
majority's conclusion that section 1981 covered neither racial harassment claims nor most promotion decisions.' °0 Justice Stevens argued
that the logic of the Jones and Runyon decisions, operating through
the doctrine of stare decisis, precluded the limiting construction
adopted by the majority. 1° 3 In addition to amplifying Justice Stevens'
argument involving stare decisis, Justice Brennan argued that the
Jones analysis suggested that section 1981 was indeed intended to
prohibit both racial harassment and racial discrimination in promotion
decisions. o4
From a purely formalistic perspective, the progression from Jones
to Runyon to Patterson could be described as a series of disputes
over the proper application of neutral principles. Certainly, almost all
of the arguments in the opinions are phrased in these terms. However,
as any critical legal theorist or conventional Realist would quickly
point out, such a description would be incredibly naive. First, the
critical legal theorist might point out that these three cases present
classic examples of the legal indeterminacy that is central to critical
legal analysis. Indeed, conventional legal analysis could support all of
the results advocated by the various Justices in Jones, Runyon, and
Patterson.Further, the critical legal theorist could observe that both
Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Runyon and Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion in Pattersonexplicitly relied upon conventional political considerations as justifications for refusing to reinstate what they
believed to be the original understanding of the drafters of the Civil

96. See id. at 175-89.
97. Id. at 171.

98. Id. at 185.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 179-80.
Id. at 219-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 189-219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 179-80, 185.
See id. at 219-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 189-202 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Rights Act of 1866.105 Moreover, the critical legal theorist could then
note that the Pattersonmajority's sua sponte decision to request briefs
on the continued vitality of Runyon was highly irregular. Finally, the
theorist certainly would observe that in each case the liberal members
of the Court voted for a sweeping interpretation of the civil rights
statutes, while the more conservative Justices almost invariably voted
to give the statutes a narrower scope. This pattern seems to support
Professor Kelman's central thesis that "our basic political ideologies
determine the legal positions we advocate more than any other factor:
there are literally no legal issues that anyone cares about in which
'' °
ideological predispositions lack primary importance.
A closer analysis of Jones, however, exposes the limits of this
analysis. Justice Harlan -- one of the Jones dissenters - was indeed
probably the most conservative Justice on the Court at the time that
Jones was decided. 107 However, the import of this characterization
easily can be overstated. The Warren Court was an extraordinarily
liberal institution, and Justice Harlan would be characterized most
accurately as a centrist by current standards. Moreover, there is simply no evidence that Justice Harlan opposed federal efforts to attack
private racial discrimination. To the contrary, in Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States10 8 and Katzenbach v. McClung, 109 Justice
Harlan joined in the rejection of plausible constitutional challenges to
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which outlawed a wide range of private
discrimination. The juxtaposition of Justice Harlan's positions in Heart
of Atlanta, Katzenbach, and Jones creates considerable difficulties for
those who explain voting patterns solely in conventional political terms.
Justice Byron White's dissenting vote in Jones is even more difficult
to reconcile with the view that judges are primarily influenced by
political considerations.11 Justice White not only concurred in the refusal to strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1964,111 but also aggres-

105. Id. at 174 ("Runyon is entirely consistent with our society's deep commitment to the
eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his or her skin."); Runyon,
427 U.S. at 191-92 (Stevens, J., concurring) ('The policy of the Nation as formulated by the
Congress in recent years has moved constantly in the direction of eliminating racial segregation
in all sectors of society. . . . For the Court now to overrule Jones would be a significant step
backwards ... ").
106. Kelman, supra note 1, at 417.
107. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
108. 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
109. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
110. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 449 (Harlan, J., dissenting, in which White, J., joins).
111. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 294; Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 241 (Justice White
joined the majority in both of these cases).
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sively interpreted the Constitution to protect the interests of minority
races in a wide variety of contexts." 2 Indeed, although Justice White
was more conservative than Justice William 0. Douglas and Thurgood
Marshall, his record on civil rights during the tenure of Chief Justices
Earl Warren and Warren Burger was clearly more liberal than that
of Justice Potter Stewart,"1 the author of the majority opinion in
Jones. Therefore, Justice White's position in Jones is very difficult to
explain in conventional political terms.
The most plausible explanation for the positions adopted by Justices
Harlan and White in Jones is that both Justices were influenced profoundly by the ideology of neutral principles. Each sincerely believed
that the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 did not intend to
outlaw private racial discrimination 14 and that the drafters' intent had
been settled conclusively by prior case law. 115 Whatever their personal
opinions on the propriety of federal intervention against private racial
discrimination, these factors led Justices Harlan and White to hold
that the Act should not govern private discrimination.
Similar considerations also may have influenced the outcome in
Patterson. A conventional political analysis of the majority's decision
to restrict the scope of section 1981 in that case 16 is more informative
than a similar analysis of Jones. Because most members of the Patterson majority had shown consistent hostility to federal protection for
the rights of minorities, their refusal to extend section 1981 is not
surprising. By contrast, the same Justices' refusal to overrule Runyon
is clearly not subject to the same explanation. Conventional political
analysis simply cannot explain why the majority of the Court chose
to outlaw racial discrimination in hiring, but not promotion.
One possible explanation for the Pattersonresult is that the Justices simply retreated in the face of the intense political reaction that

112.

See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Justice White joined the majority

in this case, upholding, against an equal protection challenge, the implementation of a public
works employment act provision which required contractors who receive federal funds to use
10% of those funds, when feasible, to procure business and supplies from minority business
enterprises); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (Justice White dissented in this case,

arguing that Mobile's at-large election system unfairly diluted the voting rights of Mobile's black
population, in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments); Milliken v. Bradley, 418

U.S. 717 (1974) (Justice White dissented in this case, arguing that courts should be empowered
to impose a multi-district remedy for single-district dejure school segregation, even if there is
no proof
113.
114.
115.
116.

that the outlying districts have practiced dejure school segregation).
See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 111-12.
See, e.g., Jones, 392 U.S. at 450 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., id. at 450-52.
See Patterson,491 U.S. at 175-85.
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greeted the initial order requesting briefs on the continued viability
of Runyon. However, the ideology of neutral principles provides an
equally plausible rationale for the structure of the Pattersonanalysis.
Overruling Runyon would have vindicated the principle that judges
are to be guided by the original understanding of the legislative drafters but sacrificed the principle of stare decisis. By contrast, narrowing
the Jones/Runyon doctrine in a manner at least facially consistent
with the original Jones analysis protected both principles. The damage
done to basic principles of statutory interpretation was circumscribed,
and the doctrine of stare decisis was also honored, at least formally.
The appeal of such a solution to judges steeped in the structures of
legal analysis is not surprising.
Of course, no one could argue persuasively that only distinctively
legal principles influenced the Justices in the Jones, Runyon, and
Patterson cases. Obviously, the Justices' basic political philosophies
profoundly influenced their attitudes toward sections 1981 and 1982.
However, one cannot describe the judicial process adequately without
a full appreciation of the importance of the ideology of neutral principles, in addition to more general political theory. Although Professor
Kelman seems to appreciate this point, 117 critical legal theory is neither
designed nor equipped to explore the influence of the ideology of
neutral principles on judicial decisionmaking. Thus, a truly adequate
model of the judicial process can be constructed only by combining
the best elements of Professor Kelman's critical legal theory with more
conventional legal analysis.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Professor Kelman and other critical legal theorists perform an important service by reminding us that judicial decisions have political
consequences that transcend narrow doctrinal concerns. But in denigrating the study of the ideology of neutral principles, they inappropriately downplay the central role that institutional context plays in
shaping the actions of judges. In addition, Professor Kelman and other
critical theorists encourage legal scholars to neglect the task for which
their training best prepares them. Of course, law professors should
not abandon their exploration of the insights to be gained from other
disciplines. Indeed, the very best scholarship on neutral principles
would incorporate such insights into the analysis. Moreover, to the
extent that interdisciplinary studies by legal scholars meet the prevailing professional standards of disciplines such as economics, political

117.

See Kelman, supra note 1, at 417.
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theory, philosophy, and history, these studies can have a significance
that transcends the relatively isolated world of legal scholarship. However, law professors who completely abandon traditional legal analysis
will not only underestimate the importance of their own expertise,
but also distort our understanding of the legal process itself.
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